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Having failed in its declared objec-
tive to turn Iraq into a stable, thriving 
and democratic country in the Middle 
East, a model unto the autocratic re-
gimes that are the region’s unfortunate 
hallmark, the United States has had 
to scale back its ambitions. Facing a 
growing sectarian conflict and fearing 
the situation would spin out of control 
it announced a security plan for Bagh-
dad and surrounding towns, as well as 
Anbar province, in January 2007. The 
plan consisted of a military initiative 
involving an extra injection of some 
30,000 troops (a “Surge”) that was de-
signed to create space and time for the 
Iraqi government to reach a political 
deal with its opponents.
In September, the Surge’s architect and implementer, Gen. David 
Petraeus, was able to claim he had made serious headway on the mili-
tary front: a number of violent actors, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and 
the Sadrist movement’s Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM), had been 
put on the defensive, and Sunni tribes had launched a revolt against 
AQI (the “awakening”). But on the political front, he was unable to show 
even the least bit of progress: the only thing the Maliki government 
had exhibited since January was its inability, or reluctance, to reach 
out effectively to Sunni Arab leaders with a view toward bringing them 
back into the new Iraqi order.
Military presence and political strife
The fatal flaw in the security plan was the decision to rely on the Ma-
liki government to bring peace to Iraq. This government is dysfunction-
al and weak. In name it is a government of national unity, but in reality 
it deserves not a single part of its name: it is not unified, it does not 
represent the nation, and it has failed to govern. 
While popularly elected (in December 2005), it 
lacks popular legitimacy. This paradox is resolved 
when we understand the nature of Iraqi politics: if 
a majority of Iraqis voted in 2005, they did so by 
religious edict and simply because they could. By 
default (in the absence of any alternatives), they 
voted for the coalition that had received the Shi-
ite religious leadership’s endorsement. Yet this co-
alition’s components were, with the exception of 
the Sadrist movement, parties that returned from 
exile in 2003 and that by and large have failed to 
connect with the Iraqi street since then. The Kurd-
ish parties do enjoy a measure of popular sup-
port, but only in Kurdistan, and their participation 
in the Iraqi government enjoys very little support 
among Kurds, as the Kurds’ overriding goal is to 
secede from Iraq, if not in this generation, then 
the next.
Not only is the government weak, it is consti-
tuted on the basis of an ethno-sectarian logic that 
favours two communities (Shiites and Kurds) at 
the expense of the third (Sunni Arabs). As such, it 
is unwilling to compromise with the Sunni Arabs, 
whom it considers unchanged regime loyalists, 
Baathists, and terrorists. To bring Sunni Arabs 
back into the state’s security structures would, in 
their view, fatally undermine the new order and 
augur the return of the former regime 
in a new guise. Rather than reconciling 
with its adversaries, the government 
thinks it will be able to crush them 
once the Americans have completed 
their job of building up, training, and 
equipping the Iraqi security forces. 
This is why it does not want the Ameri-
cans to leave just yet, however much it 
decries the occupation and calls for a 
timetable for U.S. withdrawal.
This position has a mirror image. 
Sunni Arab leaders also have come to 
the conclusion, contrary to their earlier 
insistence that U.S. forces should with-
draw at once, that these forces should 
stay, because the “Surge” has shown 
that only the Americans are able to protect them from a Shiite militia 
onslaught in Baghdad, which threatens to turn this mosaic of a capital 
into a Sunni-free city. They hope they can convince the Americans that 
the Maliki government is a proxy for Iran, and that the Sunnis and the 
Americans have a common interest in countering Iran’s spreading influ-
ence in Iraq and the wider Gulf region. They even hope that in this way 
they can get rid of the Shiite militias and regain power.
All sides, except AQI, are tugging at the Americans to stay and do 
their bidding—to choose their camp in this civil war, which continues, 
even if temporarily subdued by the additional U.S. military presence. 
The Bush administration and the U.S. Congress have made very clear 
they do not want their forces to play this role, but what options do 
they have? In the absence of a political strategy that gets around the 
Maliki government’s weaknesses and obstinacy, the Americans could 
either leave or stay. An early departure, however, is not a viable op-
tion. Such a move would leave behind a vacuum that could only be 
filled by non-state actors that are ready to go at each other’s throats 
with heavier weapons, thus increasing the possi-
bility of an escalation that could engulf the entire 
region. In turn, this would require a massive U.S. 
military intervention aimed at protecting its stra-
tegic interests in the Gulf.
Prospects
In reality, U.S. forces will not be able to stay out 
of an Iraqi civil war. This is because there will not 
be a single, neatly defined civil war, for example, 
one between Sunnis and Shiites. The more likely 
prognosis is one of a failed state in which a great 
variety of groups, enjoying at most local support, 
will battle for turf: rival militias, insurgent groups, 
warlords, and crime gangs. A sectarian conflict will 
coexist with, and intersect, an intra-Sunni conflict 
(for example, between tribal elements and AQI), 
an intra-Shiite conflict (between the Supreme 
Council’s Badr militia and JAM), and possibly an 
Arab-Kurdish conflict (over the Kurdish region’s 
boundaries, especially in Kirkuk).
In this confusing mix, the Americans will find 
groups that may be its friends one day and its 
enemies the next, the principal criterion being 
whether they serve U.S. interests: to protect a 
semblance of government and keep its adver-
saries divided and off-balance. The U.S., in other 
words, will seek to “manage” the Iraqi civil war(s) 
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It should be 
beginning to dawn 
on all the principal 
actors ... that the 
failure to contain 
the Iraqi crisis may 
spell a cataclysm of 
global proportions.
The security plan for Iraq has failed, not 
least because of its reliance on the Maliki 
government. This government is dysfunctional, 
lacks popular legitimacy, and has failed to 
govern. Prospects for the near future are 
bleak. The looming civil war will involve strife 
between a great variety of groups; U.S. forces 
will be drawn into these conflicts; and there is 
a serious threat that neighbouring countries 
also may be sucked into this vortex. The 
challenge to counter this trend is enormous. 
As the unilateralist approach to managing 
world affairs has shown its bankruptcy, 
there is now an urgent need to return to 
multilateral diplomacy, even if there are 
no guarantees of success.
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autocratic regimes and to spread their activities well beyond the region 
into Europe. And it will wreak havoc with the global economy, driving 
up oil prices to unprecedented heights and thereby suppressing eco-
nomic growth in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Iraq’s fate, and that of the region, now lies in U.S. hands. It is unclear 
whether the Bush administration has a fall-back approach, a Plan B if 
and when it comes to the conclusion that Plan A has failed. But for now, 
it cannot afford to unveil a Plan B, or even to discuss the possibility of 
the need for such a plan, as doing so would be tantamount to admit-
ting that Plan A is not working—that not only the Surge but the entire 
arrangement created since April 2003 has descended into unmanagea-
ble chaos, the new order as disorder. This, the administration is not pre-
pared to do, at least not yet. But it also does not seem to have a political 
strategy to get around the Surge’s failure to bring about a new national 
compact. Washington appears adrift, with Democrats and some mod-
erate Republicans (such as Senators Lugar and Hagel) opposing the ad-
ministration’s approach but incapable of mobilizing sufficient support 
to force a significant troop withdrawal before sometime in 2008.
This leaves us in a dangerous situation. Whatever our position was 
concerning the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and remove its tyrannical 
regime, the challenge in front of us is one that all must share. This can-
not be done as long as the U.S. keeps the reins tightly in its hands. It 
will require a joint international effort (such as we have seen, if so far 
unsuccessfully, on the Iranian nuclear issue), with shared control and 
responsibility. It should be placed under the aegis of the only agency 
that has the credibility, expertise, and resources to lead it, the United 
Nations. The unilateral approach to managing world affairs has shown 
its bankruptcy. We must now return to the painstaking and protracted 
approach of multilateral diplomacy, with no guarantee of success, but 
with the knowledge that the path chosen since 2003 can only lead to 
disaster.
with a view to containing the conflict within the country’s borders. Such 
brinkmanship, however, entails enormous risks of spillover. Neighbour-
ing states may be sucked into this vortex, against their will and strate-
gic interest, as they watch their own proxies being hammered by their 
enemies’ proxies. A regional conflagration would then enter the realm 
of possibilities.
There is a growing awareness in the region of the dangerous situation 
that has developed. If there is hope of stabilizing Iraq and its borders, it 
lies in the fact that all of Iraq’s neighbours have one thing in common: 
none of them wants Iraq to fall apart. To turn this premise into a work-
able relationship is one of the difficult challenges ahead. 
Despite President Bush’s early, adamant rejection of engagement 
with Iran in his response to the recommendations of the Baker-Ham-
ilton Study Group in December 2006, the Americans have started talk-
ing to the Iranians—for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
and the embassy takeover that followed. On at least three occasions, 
representatives of the two countries have met to discuss the situation 
in Iraq (only), but so far progress has been minimal, barely rising above 
mutual recriminations of the “You’re totally wrong” and “You’re at fault” 
type. Almost certainly, to be successful on Iraq, the two sides will have 
to expand their discussion to include the nuclear question. It is the con-
tinuing U.S. threat against Iran over its suspected offensive nuclear pro-
gramme that has induced the Iranians to act as spoilers in Iraq rather 
than play the role of regional peacemaker that its own interests in Iraqi 
stability suggest would be more constructive. (Iran is best served by 
an Iraq that is weak but friendly and united; continued chaos in Iraq 
entails serious risks for internal peace in Iran.) 
Finding a way to diplomatically manage the nuclear question, let 
alone find a durable solution for it, is a hugely difficult task that both 
governments, in Washington and Tehran, seem incapable of. The start 
of a dialogue should therefore be applauded and encouraged, even if 
real progress may not occur until after the U.S. presidential elections—
if then. It should be beginning to dawn on all the principal actors, in 
the region and outside it, that the failure to contain the Iraqi crisis may 
spell a cataclysm of global proportions. It will precipitate a humanitari-
an crisis in Iraq and neighbouring countries that will dwarf anything we 
have seen so far in the region. It will also empower a new generation of 
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